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Abstract 
Possibility theory offers a framework where both 
Lehmann's "preferential inference" and the more 
productive (but less cautious) "rational closure 
inference" can be represented. However, there are 
situations where the second inference does not 
provide expected results either because it cannot 
produce them, or even provide counter-intuitive 
conclusions. This state of facts is not due to the 
principle of selecting a unique ordering of 
interpretations (which can be encoded by one 
possibility distribution), but rather to the absence 
of constraints expressing pieces of knowledge we 
have implicitly in mind. It is advocated in this 
paper that constraints induced by independence 
information can help finding the right ordering of 
interpretations. In particular, independence 
constraints can be systematically assumed with 
respect to formulas composed of literals which do 
not appear in the conditional knowledge base, or for 
default rules with respect to situations which are 
"normal" according to the other default rules in the 
base. The notion of independence which is used can 
be easily expressed in the qualitative setting of 
possibility theory. Moreover, when a counter­
intuitive plausible conclusion of a set of defaults, is 
in its rational closure, but not in its preferential 
closure, it is always possible to repair the set of 
defaults so as to produce the desired conclusion. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It seems that there is now a general agreement about the 
foundations of exception-tolerant reasoning which have 
been proposed by Lehmann and his colleagues (Kraus et 
al., 1990; Lehmann and Magidor, 1992) and by Gardenfors 
and Makinson (1994) who provide basic systems of 
postulates for nonmonotonic consequence relations. From 
these proposals two systems are particularly emerging: on 
the one hand the System P (P for preferential) which 
offers a basic core for commonsense reasoning but 
provides a very cautious inference machinery. On the other 
hand, the rational closure inference proposed by Lehmann 
and Magidor (1992) which is based on System P 
augmented with a rational monotony postulate, provides 
more adventurous conclusions and remains more 
controversiaL Indeed , although the rational closure 
inference often gives expected conclusions, examples have 
been pointed out showing that this inference may still be 
too cautious in some situations, and another example is 
recalled in this paper showing that it may as well lead to 
counter-intuitive conclusions. In previous papers 
(Benferhat et aL, 1992; Dubois and Prade, 1995), the 
authors have shown that a simple semantics can be 
provided for the two types of nonmonotonic inferences 
(preferential and rational closure types) in the framework 
of possibility theory. Using the semantical framework of 
possibility theory, this paper explores the limitations of 
rational closure and shows that these limitations do not 
concern the principle of rational monotony as such but 
rather to the fact that some implicit knowledge, like 
independence, is not expressed. Independence information 
can be also represented in the possibilistic framework 
under the form of additional constraints on the plausibility 
ordering existing between the possible states of the world. 
Introducing independence information provides a natural 
way for getting desirable conclusions which cannot be 
obtained by the rational closure inference without 
expressing the constraints indu-ced by independence. 
Related points of view for improving plausible inference 
have been recently expressed by Delgrande and Pelletier 
(1994), Tan and Pearl (1995). 
We first briefly recall the representation of preferential and 
rational closure inferences in the possibility theory setting 
before introducing and discussing independence in this 
framework. 
2 DEFAULT AND STRICT RULES 
2. 1 Possibility Theory and Defaults 
By a conditional assertion (we also call it a default rule) 
we mean a general rule of the form 
"generally, if a then 
�" having possibly some exceptions. These rules are 
denoted by "a��" where � is a non-classical arrow 
relating two classical formulas. A default base is a set .1= 
{ai� � i· i=1, ... ,n} of default rules. The material 
implication is denoted by =>, and will be used to encode 
strict rules (without exceptions) of the form "if ai is 
observed, then certainly �i is true". Let W = { ar=��i I 
i=l,m} be a set of strict rules. 
In (Benferhat et a!., 1992), it has been proposed to view 
each conditional assertion a�� as a constraint expressing 
that the situation where a and � is true has a greater 
plausibility than the one where a and -.p is true. In other 
words, in the context where a is true, P is more possible 
or plausible than -.p, i.e., the exceptional situation aA-.p 
is strictly less possible than the normal state of affairs 
which is aAp. This is expressed by 
fl(aAp) > fl(aA-.p) 
where Il is a possibility measure (Zadeh, 1978), i.e., is 
such that, for all propositions <IJ, 'If, Il(<!Jv'l')= max(Il(<IJ), 
TI(\jl)). Moreover by convention the range of Il is [0,1] 
and Il(.L ) =0 , Il(T )= 1. To see that the max­
decomposability of Il is natural in this context, note that 
if P is the normal course of things in context a, we 
should have IlCPia)=l>fl(-,pla) if and only if Il(aAP)> 
TI(aA-.p) where the conditional IlCPia) obeys an equation 
of the form Il(aAP)=f(Il(Pia),Il(a)). Any choice for f 
such that f(l,a)=a implies Il(a)=Il(aAp) when Il(aAP) > 
n (a A -,p ), which shows that if <(J/\ 'lf=..l, then TIC <(Jv\jl)= 
max(Il(<IJ),Il('l')), changing a/\p into <IJ and aA-.p into 'If· 
It can be proved that it is still equivalent to the 
unrestricted max-decomposability property dropping the 
condition <IJA'!f=.l. 
Given a finite propositional language � , a possibility 
measure n can be conveniently described by a so-called 
possibility distribution 1t which associates to each 
interpretation roof� its degree of possibility 1t(ro). 
Then Il(<J>) = max{1t(ro) I roF=<(J}. Thus 1t rank-orders the 
interpretations according to their plausibility to represent 
the real state of the world. [0, 1] is viewed here as a purely 
ordinal scale. A conditional possibility measure is defined 
as the greatest (least specific) possibility measure such 
that Il(aAp) = min(ITCPia), Il(a)), i.e., for �..l 
IlCPla) = I if Il(a) = Il(aAp) 
= Il(aAp) if Il(a) = Il(aA-.p) > Il(aAp), 
keeping in mind that TI(a) = max(Il(aAp), IT(aA-.p)). A 
necessity measure is associated to a possibility measure 
by duality, namely 
N(Pia) = 1-TIC-.Pia). 
Here !-(-) is just a way of encoding an order-reversing 
operation. In an ordinal scale this operation just amounts 
to reversing the scale. Thus a conditional constraint can be 
equivalently written Il(aAp) > Il(aA-.p) <=> N(Pia) > 0. 
Besides, strict rules of the form "all a are P" are modelled 
here by the constraint Il(aA-.P)=O (Benferhat, 1994), i.e., 
any situation where aA-.p is true is impossible, and hence 
will be ignored in the deduction process as we shall see. 
2. 2 Universal Consequence Relation 
A set of beliefs (6.={ai�Pi• i=1,n}, W={aj:::}pj,j=1,m}) 
with consistent conditions (i.e., Vi, ai:;t.l) can be viewed as 
a family of constraints C(6.,W) restricting a family fl[(6.,W) 
of possibility distributions compatible with (6.,W): 
Definition 1. A possibility distribution 1r associated 
with a possibility measure II is compatible with ( .1, W) 
iff we have 
i) for each strict rule a;=>/3; of W: [J( a;/\ -,{3.; = 0, 
ii) for each default rule ai----'f/3; of .1:[J( a;/\f3;)>ll( a;"'-.{3;). 
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Note that TI!(6.,W) can be empty, and in this case our 
beliefs (A,W) are said to be potentially inconsistent. A 
typical example of a potentially inconsistent belief base is 
11={ a---'fj3, a----'f-.13}. However, in the general case, there are 
several possibility distributions which are compatible 
with (A,W). The question is then how to define which 
conditionals a---'fp are entailed from our beliefs (6.,W). A 
first way to do it considers all the possibility distributions 
of JI1I(A,W), namely: 
Definition 2. A conditional assertion a�{J is said to 
be a universal possibilistic consequence of ( .1, W), denoted 
by ( .1, W) I= V'll a----'f/3, if and only if f3 is a possibilistic 
consequence of a for each possibility distribution of 
J[J[( .1, W), namely iff: 
'v'trE ll7J(.1,W), [J(a/\{3) > Jl(a/\-.{3). 
In such a case we also write a F=v1t,(L'l,W) p, or more 
simply a I= vn p where a is viewed as a particular 
situation to which the knowledge (11,W) is applied in order 
to deduce plausible conditions. This is indeed a preferential 
entailment a Ia Shoham ( 1988) since it can be checked 
that Il(aAP) > Il(aA.,p) <=> {roF=a 11t(ro) = Il(a)>O} s;;; 
{ rolroF= p}, i.e., the preferred models of a (which 
maximize 1t) are models of �· It has been recently 
established (Dubois and Prade, 1995) that the inferential 
power of I== �;;�IJ is exactly the one of Kraus, Lehmann and 
Magidor (1990)' system P. 
2.3. Characterizing l!1I(A,W) 
In this section, some of noticeable features of  the 
structure of the set fi(A,W) are pointed out. For this aim, 
we associate to each possibility distribution 1t its 
qualitative counterpart, denoted by >1t and called 
qualitative possibility distribution, defined by ro>1tro' iff 
1t(ro) > 1t{ro'), which can be viewed as a well-ordered 
partition1 {EJ, . . . ,E0,E_L} ofQ such that: 
'<iroE Ei, Vro'E Ej. 1t(ro)>It(ro') iff i<j (for i:::;n, j�). 
By convention, E1. is the set of impossible worlds (i.e., 
Vroe E1_, 1t(ro)=0). Note that all the possibility distri­
butions 1t ofli1I(A,W) have the same E_L(induced by W). 
Note that each possibility distribution 1t has exactly one 
qualitative counterpart >1t· Two possibility distributions 
are said to be equivalent if they induce the same partition 
of n, and hence they infer the same set of conclusions by 
the preferential entailment of Section 2.1. We denote by 
QJI1I(A,W) the set of all the qualitative counterparts of the 
possibility distributions in JI1I(A,W). 
The following (easy) proposition shows that, for a 
qualitative possibility distribution >1t of 1Ql!1I(A, W), 
splitting any Ei into two layers leads again to a 
compatible qualitative possibility distribution, i.e., 
Proposition 1. Let >n = {EJ, ... , E;, ... , En, E.L} E 
!QJJ[(il, W). Let >n'= {EJ, ... ,E';,E"j, ... ,En,E.L} obtained 
from >n by splitting E; in E';uE";. Then >n• belongs to 
I i.e., il=E0u . . . uEnuE .l• and for htj we have EinEj=0, and 
Vi, E{IE .l =0. 
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Q!fli( .1, W). 
The following definition introduces the notion of 
qualitative linear possibility distribution: 
Definition 3. A qualitative possibility distribution 
>n= {EJ, .... En,Ej_} ofQlJ/(.1,W) is said to be linear iff 
each Er�Ej_ is a singleton (i.e., contains exactly one 
interpretation). 
Proposition 2. If ( .1, W) is consistent then there exists 
at least one linear possibility distribution in Qll( L1, W). 
Now, let us introduce the specificity ordering between 
qualitative possibility distributions (which will be used in 
Section 2.5. for defining rational closure inference). 
Defin ition 4, Let > ;r;= { E 1, . . .  ,Eno E j_} and 
> l(.,.
=f£'1, . . . , E'n•,Ej_} two possibility distributions of 
QJJJJ( .1, W). > ;r; is said to be less specific than > n' iff 
'rfj = 1, max(n,n'), ui=l.j E'; k U;:J,j Ei 
(for j > min(n,n') we use Ej =@]or n < n'). 
We denote by 'G!llmax(Ll,W) the set of the most specific 
possibility distributions in Qll11(L\,W). The following 
proposition shows that the qualitative possibility 
distributions in Qlf1lmax(Ll,W) are exactly those which are 
linear in Qfi[(Ll,W): 
Proposition 3. A possibility distribution >" of 
Q]fl/( L1, W) is linear iff it belongs to Q!Dimax( .1, W). 
Let >1t={E 1 , ... ,En,E .. d and >n•={E'1, ... , E'm,E .. d two 
possibility distributions of QlDI(A,W), then we define the 
operator Max in the following way: 
Max(>n,>1t•) = {E" 1 • · ·  .,E"min(n,m)•E..l} 
such that E"..L =E_iuE'..l· E" t=EtuE' l and 
E"k=(EkuE'k)- CU i=l.k-1 E"i) for i=2, min(n,m). 
The following proposition shows that the maximum of 
two qualitative possibility distributions in Q[l[(L\,W) is 
also in Q]ill(Ll,W), i.e., 
Proposition 4. Let > ;r; and > ;r;' be two elements of 
!Q[J/(.1,W). Then Max {>;r;, >rr'lE QJrl(.1, W) and 
Max{>;r;, >n·J is less specific than >nand >n'. 
Co rollary. There exists exactly one possibility 
distribution in rQlJI( L1, W) which is the least specific one, 
denoted by > nspe• and defined in the following way: 
>nspe =Max {>m I >mefl!DimaxCA W)}. 
2.4 Two Propositions to Restrict [[(li,W) 
The universal possibilistic consequence relation F=vrr 
produces acceptable and safe conclusions, as Lehmann et 
al.' system P does, but is very cautious. In (Benferhat et 
al., 1996) it has been proposed to augment its inferential 
power safely by adding further reasonable constraints to 
restrict the set of possibility distributions compatible with 
our beliefs. 
Let us first consider the "irrelevance" problem. It can be 
described in the following way: if a formula 8 is a 
plausible consequence of a, and if a formula P has 
"nothing to do" (namely is irrelevant to) with a oro, then 
() is deduced from aAp. "nothing to do" is understood here 
as P is a formula composed of propositional symbols 
which do not appear in the database. This situation is 
illustrated by the following example: 
Example 1. Let us only consider one default rule 
.1={b�f}. The universal possibilistic consequence relation 
cannot infer that red birds fly. Indeed, assume that our 
language contains only three propositional symbols 
{bj,r} where r is for red, then: n={aJQ:-.bA--.jA-v, Wj." 
-,bA--.jAr, (1)2;-,bAfA....,r, WJ." -,b/\fAr, aJ4: bA--.jA....,r, Wj." 
bA--.jAr, m6: bAfA....,r, aJ7-" bAfAr}. We can easily check 
that the three possibility distributions: 
• tr1(m{j) = 1Cj(W7) = 1, tr1(otherwise) = a< 1 
• 1r2( m{j) = 1; tr2( ms) = a <  1, tr2( otherwise) = f3 < a  
• trJ( W{j)=1; tr3( aJ7)=1r3( Wj)=a<l, 7rJ(otherwise)=f3<a 
are all compatible with ( L1, W) (since for each 1ri=1,3 we 
have: [Ji(bAj) > Jl;(bA:f)). We can easily verify that: 
bNI=rrJ f, bArl=rr2 :f and bAr l;z! 1C3 --if, bAr /;z! 1C3 f 
Clearly, in the previous example the possibility 
distributions tc2 and n3 are not desirable. It means that 
another constraint must be added in order to select a subset 
of ][1 (L\, W). For this aim, an interpretation w of n is 
viewed as a pair of conjuncts ro=xAy where x is an 
interpretation only constructed from propositional 
symbols appearing in t! or W while y is an interpretation 
only constructed from propositional symbols which does 
not appear in L\ or W, Then we have: 
Definition 5. A possibility distribution 1r of l!JI(W,.1) 
is said to cope with irrelevance w. r. t. (W,.1) iff for each 
interpretation m = x A y and m' = x' A y' we have: 
if x : x' then Jt( m) = Jt( m'). 
It means that if no constraint bears on a symbol s, an 
interpretation <0 refined by having s true or false, cannot 
lead to two different levels of possibility. We denote by 
ll11ilt(li,W) the set of possibility distributions of ][l(A,W) 
which are coping with irrelevance w.r.t. (L\,W). The new 
inference relation, denoted by F=v..IIR• is defined as: (L\,W) 
F=VIIR a---tp iff'lftcEJillJR.(Ll,W), ll(aAP)>Il(aA-.p). 
Let ;£.. V(t':.. W) be the set of all propositional formulas 
composed of propositional symbols appearing only in 
(L\,W), then we have: 
Proposition 5. If (A W) I= \Ill a�/3 and o� £ V( .1, W) 
then ( .1, W) I= \lllR CXA8�f3-
Using Proposition 5, it is now possible to infer in 
Example I that "red birds fly" using F=vTIR· 
A second restriction of lDI(A,W) is proposed in (Benferhat 
et al., 1996) in order to recover all the classical 
entailments obtained from {o:}ull "uW, when the 
observation a is consistent (in a classical sense) with our 
beliefs, and where L\ * is the set of formulas obtained by 
turning rules in Ll into strict rules. For example, from the 
two default rules d={b---tf, l�w}, where the second rule 
reads "generally, animal having legs walk", we would like 
to deduce that a bird having legs flies. The universal 
possibilistic consequence relation cannot infer it. This 
type of conclusions can be obtained by a further restriction 
of[[(�.W): 
Definition 6. A possibility distribution 1r of fjf!k( .1, W) 
is said to be classically consistent with (W,L1) if for each 
interpretation OJ which is a model of WuL1 we have 
n(w) = 1, and n(w) < 1 otherwise. 
We denote by fllft·c<�.W) a sub-set of lrnJR(�.W) of 
possibility distributions which are consistent w .r.t. 
(�,W). The inference relation, denoted by F=vllRC• is 
defined as: (�.W) i==VllRC 0:--4� iff 
\inE lrlJRdL'l,W), TI(a�-.p) > [1(a�-.-,�). 
Then, we have: 
Proposition 6. Let a be a formula consistent with 
L1 *uw. Then: 
{a}uL1*uW1-{3 iff(L1, W) I= 't/flRC a--4{3. 
Using Proposition 6, it is now possible to apply 
transitivity to defaults when no inconsistency in the 
classical sense takes place. For instance, letting a=b and 
.1={ b--4fo, fo--4f} where fo is for flying objects, it is now 
possible to deduce that birds fly. 
The inference F=vTIRC is still cautious in the sense that 
some expected results cannot be obtained as exemplified in 
(Benferhat et al., 1996). 
2. 5 Using the Least Specific Distribution 
and its Limits 
There is a radical way to cope with the cautiousness of 
I== Vll· It is to pick only one possibility distribution 
among JI1I (�,W): the greatest solution of the set of 
constraints, which is also said to be the least specific one. 
The idea is to consider each interpretation as normal as 
possible, namely to assign to each world ro the highest 
possibility level without violating the constraints. The 
minimum specificity principle which selects the greatest 
possibility distribution leads to a unique partition of the 
set of interpretations into different layers E1, Ez, ... ,E.L 
of decreasing possibility as explained in Section 2.3. An 
algorithm for building this partition from the set of 
constraints is described in (Benferhat et al., 1992); it is 
closely related to Pearl (1990)'s Z system for ordering 
defaults. Then, using the minimum specificity principle 
leads to defining the following inference relation: 
Definition 7. {3 is said to be a MSP-consequence 
(MSP: for minimum specificity principle) of a w.r.t. to 
( .1, W), denoted by ( L1, W) I= MSP 0:--4/3 iff ll*( a"/3) > 
Jl*( 0:/\..., {3), where ll* is the greatest solution of the 
constraints associated with ( .1, W). 
It can be checked that n*, associated to [1*, belongs to 
Jm]'{c(L'l., W). The following implications are valid: (L'l.,W) 
�== vu a.--4p => c�.w) �==vnR a.--4P � (L'l.,W) �==vnRc 
a--4!) ::::::> (.1,W) t=MSP a.--4jj. 
However the MSP-entailment has still some limitations. 
A first one, addressed in (Benferhat et al., 1994), is that 
MSP-entailment is in some cases still too cautious. An 
(important) case of cautiousness is the so-called "blocking 
of property inheritance". It corresponds to the case where a 
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class is exceptional for a superclass with respect to some 
attributes. Then, the least specific possibility distribution 
does not allow to conclude anything about whether this 
class is normal or not with respect to other attributes. For 
example let us expand the penguin example (birds fly, 
penguins are birds, penguins do not fly) by a fourth 
default expressing that "birds have legs". As it can be 
checked, we cannot deduce that a penguin has legs. A 
natural idea to overcome this cautiousness is to express 
some kind of independence between the fact of having legs 
and the fact of flying. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
A second drawback is that the MSP-entailment can 
produce some conclusions which are not intuitive. Let us 
consider a variant of "ambiguous" database known as 
"Nixon diamond" example: "Republicans normally are not 
pacifists" and "Quakers norma11y are pacifists". The MSP­
entailment can say nothing if Nixon, who is a republican 
and a quaker, is a pacifist or not. This is intuitively 
satisfying. Now let us add three further rules (not related 
to pacifism) to the previous example, which give more 
information about quakers: "all quakers are Americans", 
"Americans normally like base-ball" but "all quakers do 
not like base-ball". This is illustrated by the following 
figure: 
Figure 1 
where a "bold" edge represents a strict rule. As explained 
in (Benferhat et al., 1996), the MSP-entailment will 
deduce the undesirable result that "republican quakers are 
pacifists" in the above example. However, it is possible 
to repair the knowledge base given by an expert, and thus 
to avoid the deduction of undesirable results. This issue 
will be discussed in Section 4. 
3 USING INDEPENDENCE 
We are interested in a possibility theory-based encoding of 
pieces of information of the form "in the context a., 0 has 
no influence on P" (equivalently, "in the context a, � is 
independent of 0 (or irrelevant to o)"), where a, �. 8 are 
propositional formula; we denote this independence 
information by I{8, Pia.). The meaning of this statement is 
that in the context a, learning 8 does not change our 
belief about p. Otherwise we say that 8 has an influence 
on �(or is relevant to �) in the context a, and we denote 
it by R(o, �Ia.). The next sub-section recalls some 
properties that have been proposed in the literature for 
(ir)relevance relations. Next, we propose two related 
definitions of independence in the possibility theory 
framework. Finally, we show how the adding of 
independence information can benefit to default reasoning. 
3. 1 Prop erties of Independence Relation 
The notion of irrelevance is widely used in different areas 
(Greiner and Subramanian, 1994) and it is not easy to give 
rational postulates for irrelevance relation since this 
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notion is very dependent on the application that is 
considered. In this sub-section, we just recall properties 
proposed by (Subramanian and Genesereth, 1987) since 
they have considered general postulates for irrelevance 
relation, and the postulates discussed by Delgrande and 
Pelletier ( 1994) since these authors have addressed the 
problem of irrelevance in the context of default reasoning. 
Subramanian and Genesereth (1987) in their attempt to 
define a notion of irrelevance in problem-solving systems 
have suggested that irrelevance information must satisfy 
the following (non)-properties: 
• SG1: Non-monotonicity: in general, if in the context o:, 
� has no influence on 8, then it is not always true that in 
the context O:Ap, � still has no influence on 8. 
• SG2: Asymmetry: in general, if in the context a, � has 
no influence on 8, it does not imply that 8 has also no 
influence on �. 
• SG3: Intransitivity: in general, independence relation is 
not transitive. 
Delgrande and Pelletier ( 1994) have addressed the problem 
of irrelevance in the context of default reasoning. They 
view the notion of irrelevance as a relation between a 
property and a conditional assertion. Let fv be a 
nonmonotonic inference relation. Delgrande and Pelletier 
give some principles for (ir)relevance: 
AUG: if R(8, �Ia) then R(8Ap, �lo:). 
DeP1: if 1(8,�1o:), t=o:=<j>, t= �=ljf, t=&=� then 1(�,\lfl$). 
DeP 2: if 'Ifv o:�8 then 1(8, �Ia). 
DeP 3: if l=•o:v--,8 then 1(8, �lo:). 
DeP4: ifR(8, �Ia) then 1(...,8, �Ia). 
DeP5: if R(o, �lo:) then R(8, ·�Ia). 
DeP 6: if '[fv o:�P. 'Tfv 8�--,p and aAO is 
consistent then R(8, Plo:) or R(a, ...,�18). 
Now, let us explain briefly these properties. First, 
relevance and irrelevance are assumed to be complementary 
notions, i.e., R(o, Pia) iff not(l(o, Pia)). The property 
AUG means that relevance relation is monotonic. DeP1 
means that (ir)relevance relation must not be sensitive to 
the syntax of the premisses or the conclusions. DeP2 is 
similar to the right weakening property described in 
system P. DeP3 is reasonable if we accept to infer 
anything from inconsistent premisses. DeP 4 means that if 
8 has an inf luence on 13 in the context a, then ..,5 is 
irrelevant to � in the context a. DeP5 means that 
irrelevance relation must be insensitive to negation. DeP6 
is similar to the cautious monotony of system P. 
3. 2 Possibilistic counterpart of Delgrande 
and Pelletier's definition of independence 
Delgrande and Pelletier define a notion of relevance as: 
Definition 8. 8 is relevant to a�f3 (i.e., R(8, {3 1a)) iff 
one of the two conditions is satisfied: 
i) 'Tfva�f3 but CXA8�...,{3. or, 
ii) 'Tfv a�...,/3 but aA8�{3 
where Tis the knowledge base, and 1-v is based on some 
underlying conditional logic. 
A direct way to get a possibilistic counterpart of 
Delgrande and Pelletier's definition of independence is to 
interpret ']lv a�p by fi(aAP)>fi(aA-,p))�N(J31a)>0. 
Then, we get: 0 does not question the acceptance of 13 in 
the context a iff: 
and 
(N(pla) = 0 or N(--,plo:AO) = 0) 
(N(..,�Ia) = 0 or N(Pio:Ao) = 0) 
or equivalently, iff: 
i) N(Pia) = N(...,pla) = 0, or 
ii) N(j31aA8) = N(•Pia.A8) = 0, or 
iii) N(�lo:) = N(J31a.A8) = 0, or 
iv) N(...,�la) = N(--,plaAb) = 0. 
(DPind) 
In other words, if we are in situation of ignorance about 13 
either in the context a or aAO, or if � or --.p is totally 
uncertain both in the context a. and aA8 then () has no 
influence on 13 in the context a. This definition in our 
opinion does not completely match our intuition. For 
instance, assume that, in the context a, we do not know 
about P or ...,p, and assume that if furthermore learning 8 
allows us to deduce a. Then intuitively, we like to say 
that 0 has some (positive) influence on !3. However, using 
Delgrande and Pelletier's definition we will get that 8 has 
no influence on � according to (i). 
There is another reason why this is not the definition of 
independence that we are looking for. Our first motivation 
in using the independence information is to increase the 
inferential power of the nonmonotonic inference relation 
described in the Section 2. However, if we use (DPind), 
then we will still have the blocking inheritance problem 
To illustrate our saying, consider the penguin example 
containing the following rules {b�f. b�l. p=>b, p�--.f}. 
The use of the MSP-entailment leads to the following 
partition of n: 
E1 = { ro0: ...,P"...,b"...,f"...,'· ro1: ...,P"...,b"..., f"l, 
ro2: "'�P A...,b AfA...,l. ro3: ...,pA...,bAfAI. ro4: ...,pAbAf AI} 
E:2 = { ro5: -.p" b A ...,f" ...,,, ro6: -.p "b" ---,f" I, 
ro7: "'�pAb/\fA...,J, ro8: pAbA...,fAI, ro9: pAbA...,f/\...,1} 
E3 = {ro14: p A b A f" •I, ro15: p" b A f 1\ 1}. 
E .l = { ro 10: p A ...,b " ...,f" ..,I, w11: p 1\ ...,b " ...,fAI, 
ro1z: p 1\ ...,b 1\ f 1\ ..,I, ro13: p" ...,b" f "  1}. 
It can be easily seen that it is not be possible to deduce 
that a penguin has legs since the two preferred models 
(where penguin is true) are ro8 and ro9, i.e., one where 1 
is true and one where I is false. And, the previous 
partition satisfies the irrelevance information using 
(PDind) saying that having legs is independent of being a 
penguin in the context of bird, since: 
N(ll pAb) = N(--,11 pAb) = 0. 
The problem is that the definition of relevance proposed 
by Delgrande and Peletier is very strong since we jump 
from the situation where P is accepted to the extreme 
situation where its contrary ..,p is accepted. We shall 
propose more flexible conditions in the next sub-section. 
3. 3 Possibilistic Independence 
Several possible expressions of independence in terms of 
conditional necessity have been discussed (see Benferhat et 
al., 1994; Dubois et al., 1994). We only consider a weak 
independence notion in the following, which is 
appropriate for default reasoning. Namely o is weakly 
independent of 13 in the context a iff 
N(j)la) > 0 � N(j)la/\O) > 0. (Wind) 
When (Wind) is satisfied we say that 13 is weakly 
independent of o in the context a. Note that (Wind) is 
sensitive to negation, i.e., we cannot change o into ...,15 in 
(Wind), contrary to probabilistic independence. Similarly, 
� and o do not play symmetric roles as is the case in 
probability theory. The condition (Wind) is also 
equivalent to 
I1CI3"a) > f1C...,I3"a) � I1CI3"a"o) > IJc...,p"a"o). 
In other words, assuming that the default a-t 13 is 
independent of the truth of o just amounts to 
supplementing a-tP with a more specific default, namely 
aAS-t�. Two defaults aAO-t� and aA ...,8----tP must be 
added if a-tj) is claimed to hold regardless of the truth or 
falsity of o. 
There is one objection against the definition of weak 
independence. Indeed, it considers that everything is 
independent of a given formula if the latter is known to be 
completely uncertain. The following definition of 
independence (called strong independence) remedies this 
drawback: o does not question the acceptance of 13 in the 
context a iff 
N(j)la) > 0 iffN(j)la/\o) > 0. (Sind) 
It is clear that Sind implies Wind and that Sind implies 
DPind.l Moreover, (Sind) enables us to still guarantee 
that N(j)la AO)=D if N(j)la)=O already holds in the base. 
Before showing how possibilistic independence can 
overcome the cautiousness of MSP-entailment, let us see 
the properties of the weak (strong) independence. The 
following proposition shows that the three natural non­
properties suggested by Subramanian and Genesereth 
( 1987) are satisfied: 
Proposition 7. The relation of Weak Independence is 
non-monotone, asymmetric and intransitive. 
Counter-examples. Let p, q, r, s be propositional 
symbols. 
• For non-monotonicity, it is enough to consider the 
following possibility distribution 1t: 
n:(pAqAsA..,r) = I; 1t(pA-,qAsM) = a< l ; It( otherwise) = b<a. 
Then N(qlp) > 0, N(qlp As)> 0 but N(qlpASAf) = 0. 
• For the asymmetry property. consider the following 
possibility distribution 1t: 
n:(pA ..,qAs) = I; 
In (Dubois et al., 1994), a slightly different definition of 
independence is discussed. Namely the independence of o 
w.r.t. � in the context a amounts to write N(�la)>O and 
N(�la A O)>O. With this definition, adding to t:.. the 
supplementary information that o is independent from � in 
context a, would then include the piece of knowledge 
N(�la)>O. i.e., the rule "if a then plausibly !)'', which might 
be strange, if this piece is not already in t:.. (since it is not 
clear that people stating independence information also 
intend to implicitly state other default information). If 
N(�la)>O is already in t:.., there is no difference with the weak 
or the strong independence defined above. 
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n:(otherwise) = a<l . 
we have N(q/p)=O (hence s has no influence on q), while 
N(slp)>O but N(slpAq)=O. 
• The weak independence relation is not transitive, indeed: 
lt(pA..,rAqAS) = 1t(pA-,rAQA•S ) = 1, 
lt(pArA..,qAS) = b<l, 
n:(otherwise) = c<b. 
We can check that: 
- N(qlp) > 0 and N(qlpAs) > 0; i.e., q is weakly 
independent of s in the context p, 
- N(slp) = 0; i.e., s is weakly independent of r in the 
context p, but: 
- N(qlp) > 0 and N(qlpAr) = 0. 
Corollary. The relation of Strong Independence is non­
monotone, asymmetric and intransitive. 
Proof. It is enough to consider the counter-examples above. 
Defining Weak Relevance R(o, Pia) as a negation of the 
definition of weak independence, we obtain: 
"8 is weakly relevant to P in the context a iff 
N(j)la) > 0 and N(Pia/\0)=0". 
Similarly, we define strong relevance as: "8 is strongly 
relevant to p in the context a iff (NCPia)>O and 
N(Pia/\8)=0) or (N(j)la)=O and N(j)la/\8)>0)". 
Then we can show that the property AUG proposed in 
(Delgrande and Pelletier, 1994) is not satisfied by any of 
the two proposed definitions of independence. Indeed let us 
cons ider the following example: 
1t(pl\f/\q/\...,S) = 1; 1t(pN.,r/\...,qAS) = b<i, 
1t(pl\f/\q/\s) = c<b, 7t(otherwise) = d<c. 
We can see that N(qlp)>O, N(qlp/\s)=O (i.e., s is weakly 
(hence strongly) relevant to q in the context p) but 
N(plq/\sl\f)>O. Moreover, we have: 
Proposition 8. The relation of weak independence 
satisfies DeP 1 2 4 6 and fails to satisfy DeP 3 5· 
Proof. ' ' ' 
' 
• D e P1 is obvious since possibilistic entailment is 
independent of the syntax of the formulas. 
• For DeP2, let us assume that N(o I a) > 0. We have two cases: 
- either N(� I a) ""'0 then obviously � is independent of o 
in the context a, 
-or N(�la)>O, then with N(ola)>O we deduce that 
N ( � A o la)> O which is equivalent to Il(a A � A O)> 
[J(aA(•�v-,o)) Which implies maA�AO)>ll(aA•�), hence 
[J(aA�AO )>[J(aA•�A<l) and thus N(�laAo)>O. Note that 
DeP2 is similar to the cautious monotony (Kraus et al., 1990). 
• DeP3 does not hold. Consider the following possibility 
distribution: 
n:(a/\�/\..,0) = I and n(M�/\0) = 0 
It( otherwise) = a<l and 1t(UA..,�AO) = 0 
then we have: 
N(..,av-,o) =I, N(�la)>O and N(�laAO) = 0. 
• Proof of DeP 4: From R(o, � I a) we have: 
N(�la) > 0 � [J(M�) > n<M..,�) 
� max([J(M�Ab), [J(aA�/\..,0)) 
> max(Il(aA..,�AO), [J(aA•�A..,Il)) (a) 
Moreover: N(�laA8) = 0 � [J(aA-.�AO) :2: ll(aAJ)AO) (b) 
(a), (b) � maA�A..,O)  > max([J(aA-,!}AO), 
Il(aA-,�/\..,0), ll(aA�AO)) 
� ma/\13/\..,0) > ll(aA•�A..,O) 
� N(�laA..,O) > 0 and hence the thesis. 
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• DeP5 obviously does not hold since we cannot have 
N(�lo:)>O and N(--.�lo:) > 0. However the following postulates 
trivially holds: 
if R(o,�lo:) then I(o,•�lo:) 
since from R(o,� I o:) we have N(�la) > 0, then N(·�la) = 0 
hence 1(8,--.�la). 
• DeP6 holds. Indeed, assume that we have 1(8,�1a) and 
I(a,...,�lo). Then with the assumptions that N(j31a) > 0 and 
N(...,�lo) > 0, we deduce that N(j310:AO) > 0 and N(•j3IOAO:) > 
0, which is impossible. 
Proposition 9. The relation of strong independence 
satisfies DeP 1 2 4 6 and fails to satisfy DeP 3 5. 
Proof. ' ' ' ' 
• The proof of DeP1 and counter-examples of DeP3 5 are 
exactly the same as the ones of Proposition 4. ' 
• For DeP2 since the weak independence satisfies this 
postulate, then it is enough to show that if N(�la)=O then 
N(j31aAo)=O . Assume that N(j31o:AO)>O then we have 
Il( j3AUA0)>0(-.j3AUAO). N (ola)>O implies that il(OAU )> 
Il(•OAO:), which implies that fiCj3AUAO)> il(-.j3AUA• O), 
Therefore we have N(j31o:)>0, and this is impossible. 
• For DeP4, using Proposition 4, it is enough to consider 
the second case of R(o,j31o:) , i.e., N(j31o:)=0 and N(j31o:A0)>0. 
We can show that the previous constraints implies that 
R(-.o,j31a). Indeed, N(j3IO:AO) >0 and N(j31aA•O)>O imply 
trivially N(j31a)>0 which is impossible. 
• The proof of DeP6 is obvious using Prop. 4 since when 
N(j31o:)>0 then weak and strong independence are equivalent. 
3. 4 Application to Plausible Reasoning 
Let us first go back to the two situations recalled in 
Section 2.4 where some intuitive ideas of independence 
were translated in new constraints added to the knowledge 
base. Such a treatment is in agreement with the 
possibilistic view of independence we just introduced. 
Indeed, in the "irrelevance problem", constraints of the 
form Il(CXAr)=I1(aA...,r) were added tot. each time r is a 
partial interpretation built with literals not appearing in 
(t.,W). Such a constraint is equivalent to N(rla)=N(...,rla)= 
0. Then if N(�la)>O encodes a default in t., N(�la)>O and 
N(...,rla)=O entail N(�laAr)>O (this is rational monotony, 
see Benferhat et a!., 1992). Thus the added constraints are 
indeed expressing independence. They are a bit stronger 
since in the absence of information there is no reason to 
somewhat relax the equality n( aAT)=f1(o;A-,r) by 
introducing intermediary layers in the partition of t. in 
order to have Il(aAT)>Il(aA...,r) for some a and r, in a 
compatible way with the independence constraints. 
In Section 2.4 it was also proposed to enforce constraints 
of the form 1=1t(W)>1t(ro') as soon as roF=�*uW and 
w' 17: t.*uW, where rol=t.*uW means that w is an 
interpretation which corresponds to a normal situation 
with respect to all the default rules in �. Thus, if 
I1(�Aa)>Il(•�Aa) holds for expressing a default rule, we 
have still I1(�A<:xA(j))>f1(...,�AO:Aq) ) if q) is a partial 
interpretation consistent with t. (i.e., �AO:Aq)F=t. *UW) 
since Il(�A<:x)=max(I1(�A<:xA(j)),Il(�AO:A...,q))). Thus we are 
expressing independence with respect to situations which 
are normal with respect to the default rules in the base. 
We now present a general procedure for handling default 
rules and independence together. Let 3 = {I( oi.�il ai) I 
i=l,m} be a set of weak independencies (for a lack of 
space, strong independencies are not considered here). A 
possibility distribution 1t of lfli(A,W) is said to satisfy the 
set 3 iff for each independence information I(oi.�ilai) of 3 
we have: if Il{�jAO:i)>fi(...,�i"ai) then ITc�iAO:iASi)> 
f1(...,�iAO:iAOi). The following algorithm computes the 
partition E1, ... , Ei, E _1_ of Q obtained by applying the 
minimum specificity principle to the set of possibility 
distributions of lrn(A, W) which satisfy 3. We denote by: 
Ct, = { Max (rol ffii=O:jA�j) >1t Max (rolrol=ai"...,�i) I 
ar-��·E t.} the set of constraints on models induced by t., 
by D(C �) the set of interpretations which do not appear in 
the right side of any constraint in C �· The algorithm is: 
a. i:=O; 
b. Let .E l.. ={ rol3aj::::} �jEW s .t. (I)/= aj "'J3j}; n:=n-E 1..· 
c. While Q;t0 do c.l.-c.5 
c.l. i := i + 1; Ei:""{ ro I roE Q and roE D(C)}; A:=Ei; 
c.2. Remove from 3 each I(oi, �i lai) s.t, 3roE Ei and 
(l)/="'1�i"o;i c.3. For each I(oi, j3ilai) of 3 s.t., 3roE Ei and roF= �i"CXj 
c.3.i.Ct. =Ct. u 
(Max(rol� �i"�i.�o� >� Max(rol(l)/= ai"'j3iAOi)} 
c.3.2. 3 - 3 {I(bl' p11a1)} 
c.4. If Ei = 0 Then Stop (inconsistent beliefs) 
c.5. Remove from CtJ.any constraint containing at least 
one interpretation of E; 
c. 6. n := n - Ei 
d. Return E1, ... , E;
, 
E1_. 
At each level i, the algorithm tries to put as much as 
possible interpretations in Ej. For this aim, it puts in Ei 
all interpretations which do not appear in the right side 
any constraint in C A (step c.l. ) . 
Let us go back to the penguin example containing the 
following rules {b�f. b�l. p:::}b, p�...,f} and given in 
the previous section. Let us assume that we have one 
independence information I(p,llb) saying that in the 
context b, the property I does not depend on p. The use of 
the algorithm described above leads to the following 
partition of n: 
E1"" ( ro0: 'P"-.b"-.f"-.1, w1: ...,P " ...,b " -.fAI, 
Wz: -.pA-,bAfA-,1, w3: -,pl\--,b/\fAl, w4: ...,pAbAf/\]} 
�"" { 005: -.pAbA--,fA-,), (1)6: -.pAbA--,f/\), 
W7: "'P/\bAfA•I, Wg: pAbA-.fAI} 
E3 = { w14: pAbAfN,J, w15: pAbAfAI, ro9: pAbA•fA•I). 
El.. = { (1)10: pA•bA•fA•I, (1)11: pA•bA•fAI. 
ro12: pA•bAfA-.1, w13: pA•bAfAI). 
It is now possible to conclude that penguins have legs. 
4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Starting with the idea that System P is providing a 
minimal basis for reasoning with default rules and taking 
advantage of its semantics in terms of a family of 
possibility distributions, (i.e., in terms of a family of 
complete rankings of the interpretations), we have shown 
how to increase its inferential power by adding 
independence constraints on the possibility distributions. 
This enables the machinery to unblock intuitive results. 
Beside default rules and independence information, a third 
kind of knowledge has to be added in the knowledge base 
in the general case. This latter kind of information 
corresponds to the statement of the form "in the context 
a, do not infer !)" which is encoded in possibility theory 
by [l(a A • �f2:IT (aA�) <=> N ( i) la)=O, and indeed 
corresponds to another type of constraints on the 
possibil ity distributions. Handling such i nformation can 
help an expert to construct his knowledge base 
Indeed, often, the knowledge base provided by an expert is 
i ncomplete. Then, the inference machinery has to 
complete this knowledge, and may infer some conclusions 
by defaul t  which are not desirable for the expert. For 
instance, assume that an expert only gives one piece of 
information A={ b�f} .  This database is i ncomplete since 
it does not tell if birds which live in Antarctica fly or not. 
MSP-entailment will answer "yes" to this question, since 
it makes some "closed-world" assumption which enables 
the machinery to infer such a result. Assume that this 
result docs not please the expert who finds it debatable. 
The problem is then to find, which rule must be added to 
the knowledge base such that it will no longer be possible 
to infer this result. At the semantical level, it is enough 
to add the constraint: 
[l(bAaAf) S: [l(bAaA•f) 
which means that we ignore if birds l iving in Antarctica 
fly or not. The appl ication of m inimum specificity 
principle to the set of constraints { f1(bAaAf)S:IT(bAaA•f), 
TI(bAf) > [1(bA •f) J leads to the following partition of 0: 
E1 = { w0: -.b,•,aAf, w 1 : -.br.-.at.f, w2: ...,br.aA...,f, 
w3 : -.bA-%·,-.f, w4: bA-.aAf} 
E:1 = { ro5 : bAaA•f, ro6: bAaAf, ro7: bA-.aA-.f}. 
Note that this possibility distribution 1t belongs to 
Ill (A,W), but 1t is neither consistent nor relevant to t.. 
Then, it  is easy to check that birds fly, but we ignore if 
birds living in antarctic fly or not. 
More general ly ,  it can be shown that any MSP­
consequence which is not an universal consequence can be 
retracted, namely it can be shown (Benferhat et al . ,  1996): 
Proposition 10 Let ( .:1, W) I= MSP 1/>�1/f. Then if ( .:1, W) 
� vn 1/>----"1{1 then ¢-"II' is retractable, otherwise it is not. 
The previous proposition is very important to see how a 
defeasible reasoning system works. First, an expert gives 
a set of i ncomplete knowledge base (t.,W) . Then we 
compute a superset of (A,W) given by the possibilistic 
universal consequence relation. We denote this superset by 
(L'l.,W)P (P for system P of Kraus et a!. ( 1990)). The set 
(L'l., W)P only contains conclusions that can be safely 
inferred from L'l.. The conclusions of (t.,W)P are neither 
debatable nor retractable. 
However, there are several ways to enlarge (L'l.,W)P by 
choosing one possibil ity distribution compatible with 
(t.,W). One way to choose one element of Ili(t.,W) is to 
apply the minimum specificity principle. The added 
results to (t.,W)p by MSP-entailment are all by defaults. 
Nevertheless, if an expert considers that a conclusion, say 
<P�'I', is not desirable then it is still possible to correct 
and repair the initial knowledge base. Repairing here 
means adding a new information represented by the 
constraint [1(1j)A\jf) � TI(<jlA....,'If) and then to apply the 
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minimum specificity principle to the set of constraints 
thus augmented. 
Let us now go back to our example given in Section 2.4. 
If we do not want to have that "quakers which are 
republicans are pacifists", then we impose the constraint: 
TI(qNAp) ::;:: TI(qNAop), 
Applying the minimum specificity leads to a partition of 
Q where we ignore if "republican which are quakers" are 
pacifists or not (see (Benferhat et al . ,  1996) for details). 
Thus, undesirable conclusions seem only be due to 
missing pieces of knowledge that the system cannot guess 
on its own. Besides what has been discussed remains at 
the semantical level and syntactic counterparts of the 
presented procedures have still to be developed. 
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